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Abstract 
 
One of the consequences of major regulatory reform of the telecommunications sector 
from the end of the 1970s – particularly, privatization, liberalization and deregulation – 
was the establishment of a new business environment which permitted former national 
telecommunications monopolies to expand internationally. From the 1990s, a number of 
these firms, particularly those based in Europe, joined the rankings of the world’s 
leading Multinational Corporations. Their internationalization was uneven, however: 
while some firms internationalised strongly, others went abroad much slower. This 
article explores how the regulatory framework within which telecommunications 
incumbents evolved over the long-term helped shape their subsequent, uneven, paths to 
internationalization. Two cases representing ´maximum variation´ are selected: 
Telefónica, whose early and unrelenting expansion transformed it into one of the 
world’s most international of Multinational Corporations, and BT, whose international 
ventures failed and, with decline domestic shares, forced the firm to partial de-
internationalization, becoming the least international of the large European 
incumbents. Long-term ownership, access to capital, management style and exposure to 
liberalization strongly influenced firms’ approaches to internationalization. 
 
Keywords: Regulation, telecommunications, internationalization, Europe, privatization, 
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 Introduction 
 
Across half a century, from the interwar period to the 1980s, the organization of 
telecommunications systems across Europe reached considerable convergence 
(Millward, 2005: 245; Noam, 1992). Telecommunications had, by this time, been 
largely organised into national networks, and were operated by the State on a monopoly 
basis, often under the auspices of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT), usually as 
part of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (Bauer, 2010). Switching 
equipment was generally provided by private electrical equipment manufacturers, and 
terminal equipment by the PTT. The most conspicuous exception to this pattern of 
public involvement was Spain, where the Primo de Rivera dictator had allowed the US 
Multinational Corporation, ITT, to set up, control and operate from 1924 a private 
monopoly under the Spanish name Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España, known 
today as Telefónica (Comín & Díaz-Fuentes, 2004).1 Other exceptions included Italy 
and Scandinavia, where the State only owned the trunk networks (Noam, 1992). 
Generally speaking, under State ownership and control, the management style of 
telecommunications monopolies was inward-looking, the priority being to provide 
national telecommunications services to users on a universal service basis (Clifton & 
Díaz-Fuentes, 2010a, 2010b). Millward (2005, 2010) provides a mix of political, legal, 
technological and economic reasons to explain the common economic organization of 
telecommunications across Europe. If, originally, the potential for telecommunications 
was unclear, once their importance was fully recognised, governments sought to forge, 
and then, control, national networks for military and strategic objectives. Governments 
were also best positioned to resolve rights of way issues for network development. 
Monopoly operation of the national networks was facilitated by the relative simplicity 
of the technology – voice transmission to a single handset - and was, moreover, justified 
since the sector was understood to exhibit natural monopoly characteristics and network 
externalities. In the three decades previously, as telecommunications networks were 
evolving, multiple sets of conflicting interests had intervened in their development – 
geographically (local, regional and national) and through investment (private/public, 
domestic/foreign) – but these tensions were largely relaxed as the State assumed 
ownership and control.  
 
Regulatory change, which, though somewhat unevenly and not always completely, 
undid this former arrangement, commenced from the end of the 1970s. Technological 
change such as the emergence of new customer premises equipment (computers, 
modems, multiple telephone handsets, fax and telex terminals) and value added services 
(mobile networks and phones, email, fax and audiovisual conferences) was a key driver 
of this shift. As telecommunications equipment became more important to users and, 
since it could lay no claim to natural monopoly status, pressure increased from the 
business sector, challenging the continued monopoly status of telecommunications and 
PTO privileges (Millward, 2005: 252, Noam, 1992: 6). Major regulatory changes were 
introduced to reorganise the sector: privatization, liberalization and deregulation. 
Responsibility for implementing these changes was divided between the European, 
national and local authorities. In the context of the evolving European project, which 
                                                 
1 Telefónica was originally called the Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España until 
the 1980s, when, in a re-branding exercise, this was shortened to Telefónica. For 
convenience, Telefónica will be used here. 
aimed to forge a Single Market by 1992, the European Commission was responsible for 
implementing liberalization and competition. Privatization was a decision for national 
or local authorities, since the European Commission was bound to remain neutral on 
issues of ownership (Clifton, Comín & Díaz-Fuentes, 2003). National governments 
were also responsible for the establishment of independent regulatory agencies to 
oversee telecommunications reform, since the formation of an European-level 
telecommunications regulatory agency was blocked by the 1958 Meroni doctrine, 
prohibiting as it did the upward delegation of decision-making of this type except that 
ratified by Treaty amendment (Pelkmans, 2001: 455).  
 
Now, the unravelling of the previous regulatory framework changed the business 
environment of national telecommunications monopolies, opening up new options for 
their managers. Under state ownership and control, expansion into foreign markets had 
been neither feasible nor necessarily even desirable (Clifton, Comín & Díaz-Fuentes, 
2007). The unfolding new regulatory framework opened the door to enterprise 
expansion abroad: indeed, many telecommunications enterprises seized the opportunity 
to internationalise swiftly and extensively. As a consequence, some of Europe’s former 
national telecommunications monopolies emerged among the world’s largest 
Multinational Corporations as measured by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 
2004, 2008). Resulting shifts in the economic organization of the sector towards greater, 
albeit uneven, privatization, competition and internationalization, were partially 
reminiscent of the way in which telecommunications were organised in the first few 
decades from the end of the nineteenth century to around 1913, differing in that, in this 
new phase, the former telecommunications monopolies themselves became protagonists 
of change, leading the bids to compete in Mergers and acquisition opportunities. This 
pattern mirrors closely the findings of Hausman, Hertner and Wilkins (2009) who 
contrast the role of electricity enterprises in the first and second wave of the sector’s 
internationalization.  
 
But firms’ paths from national monopolies to Multinational Corporations varied. While 
some incumbents, both large, such as Telefónica, France Télécom, Deutsche Telekom, 
and smaller, including TeleSonera, Telenor and Tele Danmark, emerged as successful, 
highly internationalised Multinational Corporations, others proved slower to go abroad, 
internationalizing only modestly, whilst others met with failure, such as BT which, 
effectively, de-internationalized. Whilst scholars agree that regulatory change 
(privatization, liberalization and deregulation) of the telecommunications sector were 
prerequisites for the ensuing internationalization of the former telecommunications 
monopolies (Bonardi, 2004; Sarkar et al., 1999), there is disagreement over why some 
firms internationalised much more vigorously than others. This topic is of considerable 
interest to scholars of business and policy history, and has important consequences for 
Europe’s economic development. In this light, this article seeks to examine how 
regulation shaped, over the long-term, the paths taken by former telecommunications 
monopolies towards their transformation into huge Multinational Corporations. In the 
second section, we present the argument proposed by international business scholars 
which asserts that variations in the extent of internationalization by former 
telecommunications monopolies can be explained by short-term asymmetries in national 
regulatory structures. Highlights of our results which examine data on the extent of 
internationalization at firm level and indicators of regulation at country level over the 
short-term are presented, and our rejection of this argument is summarised. Instead, the 
extent of enterprise internationalization is best explained at the firm level (Clifton, Díaz-
Fuentes & Revuelta, 2010). Over the long-term, however, regulatory structures did 
influence enterprises and their paths towards becoming Multinational Corporations. To 
illustrate, case studies are used. Following Flyvberg (2006), two case studies 
representing ‘maximum variation’ are selected: Telefónica, whose bold, early, 
unrelenting and deep internationalization into Latin America and, later, Europe, 
transformed it into one of the most international of former telecommunications 
monopolies today; and BT, whose internationalization strategy, mainly comprising 
global alliances with North American and other peers met with failure, and its ultimate 
de-internationalization, leading to a more modest international presence. We show in 
particular how enterprise ownership, rules on access to capital, management style and 
exposure to liberalization all played a part in shaping firm behaviour, influencing its 
path to internationalization. 
 
Understanding how regulation shaped internationalization 
 
In the post-war decades, the bulk of the literature by international business scholars 
seeking explain firm internationalization built their theories largely around explaining 
those developments occurring to firms belonging to the manufacturing and oil sectors. 
This bias reflected the profile of Multinational Corporations, dominated as it was by 
these sectors (UNCTAD, multiple years). Of course, Multinational Corporations in 
telecommunications had existed for over a century: to cite just three giants, ITT, 
founded in 1920, became the main international telecommunications company of the 
United States; Cable & Wireless, created in 1934 on the merging of the Eastern and 
Associated Telegraphy Company & Wireless Telegraph Company, emerged as the 
international communications firm of the UK Post Office after its nationalization in the 
post-war period; and Swedish Ericsson also embarked on internationalization from the 
beginning of the twentieth century, offering telephone services in Latin American cities, 
such as in Mexico City from 1905 until, after fighting with its rival, ITT, saw all the 
network merge into Telmex in 1947 (Clifton, 2000). But these Multinational 
Corporations had not evolved from national monopolies; indeed, they often competed 
harder abroad than in their home markets. Broadly speaking, national 
telecommunications monopolies had little or no international presence during this 
period.  
  
This situation changed dramatically from the 1990s, when a significant number of 
national incumbents emerged as huge Multinational Corporations as a consequence of 
regulatory reform from the 1970s. Parallel developments occurred in other sectors 
undergoing regulatory change - electricity, gas, water and transportation – though 
telecommunications was the most dramatic (UNCTAD, 2008). In response, 
international business scholars turned to re-develop existing internationalization 
theories in the light of the particular economic characteristics of those utilities under 
analysis. In the case of telecommunications, scholars emphasised that the sector 
exhibited network economies and economies of scale, and also pointed out that 
investment opportunities in telecommunications tended to be large, rare or even once-
off, high-risk and involved moving into spatially embedded networks. Concurring that 
regulatory reform, particularly privatization and liberalization, together with these 
economic features were central to understanding the internationalization of the former 
national telecommunications monopolies, they integrated these policy and economic 
idiosyncrasies into their analyses (Sarkar et al., 1999: 368, Bonardi, 2004).  
 
While scholars agreed that privatization and liberalization had been essential in 
establishing the conditions for the former telecommunications monopolies to 
internationalise, explanation was needed on the dynamics and pace of this process.  
Why had some former monopolies embarked on a deep, unrelenting internationalization 
drive, whilst others moved more slowly? Why were some internationalization strategies 
successful, whilst other strategies failed repeatedly, resulting in a retreat, or, de-
internationalization? Attention was placed on trying to explain the different extent of 
firm internationalization. Among these studies, of particular importance is Bonardi 
(2004) and Sarkar et al. (1999) who proposed that telecommunications enterprises 
would internationalise at different paces depending on the differences in the timing and 
quality of privatization and liberalization policies across countries. Their explanation 
was as follows. Because Mergers and acquisitions in telecommunications are usually 
rare, risky, expensive and politically complex, those firms with significant political 
involvement and support have an advantage. Because governments tend to intervene 
more actively where levels of public ownership are higher, firms with more public 
ownership (or, less privatization) would easier access ‘insider’ information about the 
deals, and enjoy more support, knowledge and experience from politicians as 
‘diplomats’ of the transactions. More privatization, logically, meant the firm was 
external to ‘insider’ deals, perhaps making their international expansion more complex. 
A relationship between liberalization and internationalization was also established. 
Scholars including Bonardi (2004), Chari and Gupta (2008), Haar and Jones (2008) and 
Sarkar et al. (1999) argued that governments might opt (sometimes under pressure from 
the monopoly itself) to implement liberalization slowly, incorrectly or partially, in order 
to give breathing time to the ‘national champion’ to adjust to the changing 
circumstances, whilst providing it with monopoly rents in order to support their 
undertaking of risky international operations. Therefore, those telecommunications 
monopolies facing slower or less extensive pressures to liberalize at home would be 
better positioned to internationalise more. Even in the European context, despite the fact 
that directives governed liberalization, it was unlikely that all member states would 
implement liberalization identically, regarding its timing, quality and extent. Some 
governments, including the UK, had introduced liberalization before European 
liberalization directives were passed, whilst other governments such as Ireland, Greece 
and Portugal used formal extensions. To sum up, the argument claims that those former 
telecommunications monopolies least exposed to privatization and liberalization in their 
national settings would be those expected to internationalise most.  
 
A straightforward means of testing these hypotheses is to assemble data on incumbent 
internationalization at the firm level, and privatization and liberalization at the country 
level, and conduct regression analyses. However, on so doing, it was found that the 
extent of internationalization is not determined by relative delays in privatization or 
liberalization and both hypotheses were thus rejected (Clifton, Díaz-Fuentes & 
Revuelta, 2010). Massive internationalization was done both by firms that had 
experienced significant inward internationalization pressures, as well as those who were 
based in countries where liberalization lagged behind. Similarly, firms with different 
levels of privatization went international successfully. Both smaller and larger 
telecommunications incumbents proved able to emerge as Multinational Corporations. 
The extent of internationalization is, therefore, best explained at firm level.2 
 
The diversity of the pace and timing of internationalization activities of Europe’s 
telecommunications incumbents is shown on Table 1. Of the large incumbents, by 2007, 
Telefónica was the most international, generating 64 percent of its total sales abroad, 
followed by Deutsche Telekom and France Télécom, at 53 and 50 percent respectively. 
BT was the least international of the large incumbents, reaching only 15 percent. As 
regards timing, Telefónica was the first mover of the large incumbents, producing over 
40 percent of its sales abroad by the end of the 1990s, followed by its German and 
French peers. BT was slower to go abroad, then, from 2002, it de-internationalised 
significantly, to return again to overseas expansion, but slowly. Being a smaller 
incumbent proved no barrier to strong internationalization: by 2008, Telenor and 
TeliaSonera had proved particularly successful in their ventures, whilst others, such as 
OTE, Swisscom and TeleDanmark, internationalized more slowly.  
 
Table 1.  European telecom incumbents ranked by revenue: international sales as 
percentage of total, 1999-2007    
 Company Country 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
 Revenues 
USD Millions 
2007-08
 Deutsche Telekom Germany 11.4 27.3 37.9 42.6 50.9   85 638
 Telefónica Spain 41.3 51.5 37.4 47.5 64.2   77 316
 France Telecom France 13.3 35.8 41.3 42.7 50.0   72 548
 Telecom Italia Italy 5.9 20.4 19.6 20.6 29.3   42 863
 BT United Kingdom 7.1 8.7 6.4 8.5 14.7   41 408
 KPN Telecom Netherlands 9.5 22.0 23.0 28.6 31.4   17 070
 Telenor Norway 15.4 10.0 36.8 51.3 65.5   15 780
 TeliaSonera Sweden 10.3 19.0 48.6 55.6 62.6   14 252
 Swisscom Switzerland 9.1 29.9 30.9 0.6 15.1   9 241
 OTE Greece 0.5 1.9 19.3 24.5 25.5   8 657
 Portugal Telecom Portugal 8.8 24.5 24.0 34.3 44.7   8 422
 TDC Denmark 41.8 55.4 45.3 49.0 37.0   7 228
 Telekom Austria Austria 0.0 7.1 11.0 25.5 35.9   6 738
 average   16.5 29.2 31.8 36.3 45.5  
Source:  Firm Annual Reports, AMADEUS (2010) and OECD (1999-2009) Communication Outlook. 
 
Short-term differences in national regulatory frameworks do not explain these 
internationalization patterns. The best indicators on the evolution of national regulation 
are constructed by the OECD (undated). Here, privatization is simply measured as the 
proportion of incumbent shares owned by the government, whilst liberalization is 
understood in two ways. First, it is measured by whether liberalization legislation has 
been introduced (white for monopoly, grey for duopoly and dark grey for competition). 
Second, is the market share of new entrants in trunk telephony (‘real’ competition)? The 
two liberalization indicators are superimposed on Table 2. From the post-war to 1995, 
telecommunications was organised as a monopoly across Europe, with the exception of 
the UK, where a duopoly was established from 1984 to 1991, in which Mercury gained 
access to less than 20 percent of the market. Private sector involvement did not start 
                                                 
2 Detailed results of the correlation analysis can be found in more detail in Clifton, 
Díaz-Fuentes and Revuelta (2010).  
with BT, as is commonly stated, but with Telefónica, which was actually established in 
1924 as a private company, as is discussed later in the paper. By 1997, BT, Telefónica 
and TeleDanmark were fully privatised whilst average government ownership in the 
EU-15 was 66 percent. The UK was the liberalizing pioneer, followed by Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden, from 1995, the Netherlands from 1996 and France from 1997, 
while nine other countries liberalised in time with the deadline set by the European 
Commission (1998-2001), including Spain, which had already introduced a weak 
duopoly from 1995. Despite this, Telefónica dominated its home market more securely 
than any of its peers, Spain having the lowest market penetration of new entrants in the 
trunk market. 
 
Table 2.  Regulation of European telecommunications: liberalization, market 
competition and privatization, 1975-2007 
 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Austria Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 54 46 45 44
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 100 100 88 61 47 30 27
Belgium Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 15 15 31 28
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 51 51 54 54 54 54 54
Denmark Market % 0 0 0 0 0 5 38 36 37 39 34
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 51 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland Market % 0 0 0 0 60 60 62 63 63 62 60
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 100 100 77 53 19 14 14
France Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 36 38 40 42
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 100 62 62 59 59 43 27
Germany Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 33 40 43 49
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 100 63 60 46 43 37 31
Greece Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 21 24 27
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 96 65 58 42 34 31 28
Ireland Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 32
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 100 80 41 0 0 0 0
Italy Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 25 25 27 29
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 50 5 4 4 0 0 0
Luxembourg Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 12 18 24
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Netherlands Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 24 40 34 28
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 56 44 44 39 19 8 0
Norway Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 27 32 31 30
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 100 100 90 78 62 62 54
Portugal Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 20 31
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 73 25 13 3 7 7 8
Spain Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 18 18 20 21
 
Privat.% 35 35 35 35 21 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sweden Market % 0 0 0 0 5 17 14 31 31 37 42
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 100 100 85 71 46 48 50
Switzerland Market % 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 37 45 42 38
 
Privat.% 100 100 100 100 100 100 68 64 63 59 55
United Kingdom Market % 0 0 0 8 19 24 36 46 46 43 40
 
Privat.% 100 100 50 50 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Liberalizaton framework: Monopoly Duopoly  Competion
Market % : What is the market share of new entrants in the  trunk telephony market
Privat. %. What percentage of shares in the incumbent are owned by government?
 
Source:  OECD (undated)  
 
How, then, can the different extents of incumbent internationalization be accounted for?  
Given our findings that internationalization is best explained at firm level, one option is 
to conduct detailed case studies of individual incumbents and analyse how factors such 
as privatization and liberalization shaped the firm’s approach to internationalization. 
Following Flyvberg (2006), we design our case study using the ‘maximum variation’ 
strategy, whereby cases are selected that are the most similar regarding the main factors 
under examination bar that factor which needs explanation. It is therefore of interest to 
analyse Telefónica, whose early, aggressive and unrelenting expansion transformed it 
into one of the most international of incumbents today; and BT, whose hesitant and 
troubled ventures abroad led to its ultimate de-internationalization, and a relatively 
modest international presence. Telefónica and BT represent large incumbents, both were 
exposed earlier on to privatization than the other large incumbents, and both were 
subject to timely or premature liberalization policies. This is done in the next section.  
 
Longer-term regulation and incumbent internationalization 
 
This section aims to shed light on how longer-term regulation influenced Telefónica’s 
and BT’s approach to the opportunities opened to them by regulatory change, 
particularly, their different paths to becoming Multinational Corporations. In order to do 
so, the previously presented data on firm internationalization, and country liberalization 
and privatization is supplemented with recently published important business history 
studies on both firms (Calvo, 2010; Parker, 2009), as well as comparative historical and 
economic studies of utilities and Multinationals in Europe, company annual reports and 
other secondary material.  
 
Telefónica 
 
By the 1950s, Telefónica had emerged as Spain’s largest firm but, by the 1990s, it had 
emerged as a leading world Multinational Corporation (UNCTAD, 2008). Historians 
have argued that Telefónica represents an exceptional case of business organization in 
Europe (Calvo, 2010). Three major, interrelated, features help explain its distinctiveness 
over the long term, particularly vis-à-vis its European peers: firstly, its origins as a 
private, foreign owned and controlled firm; secondly, its management style, which 
closer resembled a private than a public enterprise; and thirdly, its relatively fluid access 
to credit and the stock market. Analysis of Telefónica is divided into three parts: 
origins, access to finance, and the road to internationalization.  
 
Born a foreign-owned and controlled private monopoly. The origins of today’s 
Telefónica go back to 1924 when, following the coup d´etat in 1923, General Primo de 
Rivera granted a twenty-year contract to the recently founded Telefónica to operate the 
national telecommunications network and supply its equipment on a private monopoly 
basis. Telefónica had been founded just a few months before the coup and, despite 
having a Spanish name and its inclusion of well-known Spanish industrialists and 
bankers on its board, it was actually controlled by the emerging United States 
Multinational Corporation, ITT, working in conjunction with Spanish banks Urquijo 
and Hispano Americano (Álvaro, 2008; Comín & Gálvez, 2006: 119). ITT, in turn, had 
been established in 1920 by the Behn brothers who had merged two small 
telecommunications firms in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The ambitious brothers ‘dreamed of 
achieving overseas what AT&T had accomplished in the US’ (Wilkins, 1974) and 
Telefónica became ‘the jewel in ITT’s communication empire’ (Little, 1979), 
facilitating ITT’s entrance into Europe, and bolstering its stature as the world’s leading 
telecommunications Multinational Corporation by the end of the 1920s (Sobel, 2000). 
Lacking technological capabilities of its potential competitors (AT&T owned Western 
Electric whilst Ericsson, Siemens-Halske and New Antwerp Telephone and Electrical 
Works dominated European markets), the Behns acquired International Western Electric 
company, the international subsidiary of AT&T and Western Electric, renaming it 
International Standard Electric Company, and Standard Eléctrica, in Spain (Wilkins, 
1974). By so doing, they diversified their business to manufacturing, in addition to 
sealing control over network and equipment provision to the Spanish market.3 ITT was 
a key player in the ‘Americanization’ of Europe (Zeitlin and Herrigel, 2004; Schröter, 
2005), but Spain represented an extreme case, as most of ITT’s investment in Europe 
was concentrated in the telecommunications manufacturing.  
 
With the Civil War over, Telefónica’s ownership changed. The Franco dictatorship 
immediately introduced tighter restrictions on FDI and Multinationals, with the 1939 
law specifying a 75% quota of Spanish national participation for companies (Wilkins, 
1974). Many US Multinationals, including ITT, found the political situation so complex 
and volatile that they sought to exit Spain (Álvaro 2007, 2008). When Telefónica’s 
contract expired in 1944, the government issued a decree placing the majority of stock 
in Spanish hands. So, despite having supported the fascists and the Nazi regime during 
the Civil War, the Behn brothers did not receive preferential treatment from the 
dictatorship (Little, 1979). Telefónica was nationalised in May 1945. The State took just 
over half of ITT’s 80 percent stock; 12 percent went to the Central Bank, Banco de 
España, and the rest was split between 700,000 smaller shareholders. ITT retained the 
right to supply equipment on a monopoly basis, a privilege that would continue until the 
1980s. ITT would, anyway, shift away from service and towards manufacturing 
provision (Sobel, 2000: 7, 117). 
 
Though Telefónica was nationalised whilst retaining monopoly privileges, as so many 
other telecommunications enterprises in Europe, the way in which it was nationalised 
differed to most of its peers. Nationalisation was never total; rather, Telefónica 
remained a mixed public-private ownership until its full privatization in the 1990s. 
Comín and Gálvez (2006: 121) referred to this process as ‘naturalization’, given the 
emphasis on indigenous ownership, whether private or public. This arrangement had 
important consequences for Telefónica’s management style, which reflected conflicts of 
interest between private shareholders and public service investment. Indeed, Telefónica 
was managed more along the lines of a private business than a public utility. Unlike 
most of its European counterparts, it was never run as part of the Ministry or the Post 
Office. Instead, the regime colluded with private interests in the board (banks and ITT 
as manufacturer) at the expense of other shareholders. The regime appointed 
Telefónica’s president, who decided on strategy, whilst the firm was organised 
according to clear functional divisions, with business managers reporting to the board 
and shareholders. Managers enjoyed high levels of autonomy.  
 
Financing Telefónica. Thanks to its ownership characteristics, Telefónica became very 
successful at generating finance through public offerings. Between 1924 and 1966, 
fourteen public offerings were made, attracting a total of 1.4 billion pesetas in shares 
                                                 
3 Little (1979) describes the ‘wheeling and dealing’ between the Behn brothers and 
highly-placed Spanish officials and US Ambassadors to favour ITT’s successful control 
of the telecommunications market. 
(Calvo, 2010). Between 1950 and 1980, Telefónica leveraged external bank borrowing 
and self finance to launch new share issues. Its mixed ownership limited additional 
share emissions because the State was contractually obliged to purchase a percentage of 
issued shares (Calvo, 2010: 261-2). From the mid-1960s, what became an infamous 
media campaign on Spanish television promoted popular capitalism through the sales of 
so-called Matildes, named after the girlfriend of the advert’s protagonist, who tried to 
use his ownership of Telefónica shares as a means of demonstrating his prowess and 
credentials as a husband (Rodríguez, 2005). In reality, however, the rate of return and 
dividends were modest (6.74 percent in 1950 to 8.72 percent in 1977). The price of 
Telefónica shares remained stable until 1973; indeed, investing in Telefónica was 
considered so safe that shares were nicknamed ‘widow’s shares’ in Spain, and 
categorized as ‘blue chip’ on the stock markets. However, after reaching a peak of 490 
pesetas per share in 1973, their value plummeted to a low of 84.5 pesetas over the next 
four years, in parallel with the international economic crisis and the collapse of the 
Spanish stock market as the Franco regime came to an end. 
 
The road to internationalization. The democratic transition (1976-1982) marked a new 
phase in Telefónica’s evolution, which was consolidated when Spain joined the 
European Community in 1986 (Comín, 2008). After accession, Spain would be forced 
to adopt Community rules on anti-trust and market competition. Even though European 
reforms would not affect telecommunications until the 1990s, and privatization was not 
a competence of the European Commission, the Spanish government embarked on 
industrial restructuring and partial privatization in the quest for improved performance. 
One main objective of the first Socialist governments (1982-1996) was to improve the 
management of monopolies, including Telefónica, partly, through its policy of partial 
privatization. The aim was to retain public enterprises only in those sectors where their 
activity was considered strategic and there was some prospect of survival. The 
privatization of public enterprises got under way from the mid-1980s when minority 
share packages of profitable public enterprises, including Telefónica, Repsol, Endesa 
and Argentaria, were placed in national and international stock markets (Comín, 2008).  
 
As in the rest of Europe, the Spanish government recognised that significant investment 
was required to adapt to new communication technologies and to improve waiting lists 
for connections and service quality. At the end of 1982, Socialist MP Luis Solana was 
appointed president of Telefónica. Solana had long been an outspoken critic of 
Telefónica’s management from the opposition, particularly its technological dependence 
on ITT (Solana, 1979). Solana broke the long-standing technological dependence on 
Standard Eléctrica, by introducing new policies on equipment acquisition and 
technology transfer. He publicly accused Standard Eléctrica of overpricing (El País, 
1983), whilst because ITT was diversifying away from telecommunications equipment 
provision to other businesses, the technology it supplied was in decline (López, 2003).4 
A breakthrough towards internationalization and further privatization occurred in 1985, 
when Telefónica became the first Spanish enterprise to be listed on the London Stock 
Exchange and other European markets. Telefónica embarked on various R&D and 
export-promotion projects, in addition to joint ventures and cooperative agreements 
involving industrial production and technology transfer. In 1986, strategic agreements 
                                                 
4 ITT was considering selling off Standard Eléctrica (El País, 8 January, 1981), and did 
so in 1988 to Alcatel NV, a subsidiary of the French publicly owned Multinational 
Compagnie Générale d'Électricité. 
and joint ventures were established with various international firms, including AT&T 
Technologies, SysScan, Olivetti, Brown Boveri, Philips, Saab-Scania, Telfin and 
Fujitsu. In June 1997, the government launched a public offering of 6 percent in the 
New York Stock Exchange, reducing State ownership from 38 to 32 percent. Its 
trajectory of attracting finance reduced the State burden to secure infrastructure 
investment finance. So, during the 1980s, whilst most European telecommunications 
enterprises - except for British Telecom - were still State-owned, Telefónica was subject 
to international external discipline through flotation in international stock markets. The 
aim behind privatization was to have Telefónica listed in international stock markets, 
hence facilitating the finance of its international expansion without affecting the public 
budget (Bell & Trillas, 2005). 
 
Solana was replaced by Cándido Velázquez, former president of Tabacalera, another 
historical monopoly, who embarked on a new phase of corporate internationalization 
from 1989. Telefónica targeted acquiring telecommunications enterprises put up for sale 
in the aftermath of the debt crisis in Latin America, many of which became privatized 
monopolies (Ramamurti, 2006). Though Telefónica would later liberalize in line with 
European telecommunications directives, it is notable how its earlier acquisitions were 
achieved as a national monopoly. Telefónica acquired controlling stakes in Compañía 
Telefónica de Chile and  Telefónica Argentina SA in 1990, and bought stakes in 
Compañía Anónima de Telefonos de Venezuela and Telefónica of Puerto Rico in 1991. 
In 1994, it bought participations in Colombian COCELCO and Telefónica de Perú and, 
in 1996, in Brasilian Companhia Riograndense de Telecomunicaçoes. To manage these 
International acquisitions, Telefónica International SA (TISA) was set up in 1994, 
becoming Telefónica’s largest subsidiary. At the same time, Telefónica sought to 
develop international alliances to head off hostile takeovers and to gain momentum for 
expansion. Most of the strategic alliances in which Telefónica was involved were of a 
protective nature, between small and medium-sized enterprises. In 1993, Telefónica 
joined the UNISOURCE alliance along with KPN, Telia, Swiss Telecom, and AT&T 
Worldpartners. TISA remained outside of UNISOURCE since it was negotiating an 
agreement with Concert (BT 75 percent, MCI 25 percent). AT&T questioned conflicts 
of interest between Telefónica in UNISOURCE and TISA in Concert; in any case, 
neither alliance was to last. 
 
With the accession of the Popular Party (PP) to power in March 1996, the drive to 
privatize intensified, becoming total and generalised in scope. For the first time in 
Spanish history, a government spoke openly about eliminating all public ownership 
(Comín, 2008). In June 2006, Prime Minister José María Aznar appointed José 
Villalonga as Telefónica’s president, an old school friend of his, but who had no 
experience in telecom industry (Bell & Trillas, 2005). Telefónica was fully privatized in 
February 1997, when the government sold its remaining 20 percent share (Clifton, 
Comín & Díaz-Fuentes, 2007). Villalonga’s team saw UNISOURCE as a failed 
international alliance so, in April 1997, Telefónica sought to join the Concert alliance, 
formed on the merger of BT and MCI in 1996 for two main reasons: to protect its home 
market from BT, which was at the time Telefónica’s most serious rival in Europe, and 
also to avoid competing with MCI, one of its competitors in Latin America. When MCI 
was taken over by World Com in 1997, however, Concert collapsed, so Telefónica 
formed an alliance with MCI WorldCom to offer services in Europe and improve its 
position in Latin America. During Villalonga’s short reign, until 2000, Telefónica 
continued its expansion across Latin America, increasing its stake in Telefónica de 
Argentina (28.8 to 97.9 percent), Telesp (17.5 to 86.6 percent), Telefónica de Perú (40 
to 93.2 percent), and Tele Sudeste (17.6 to 75.6 percent). 
 
From 2000 onwards, the PP apointed César Alierta as Telefónica’s CEO. Alierta had 
experience in managing huge mergers, having been previously CEO of former Spanish 
tobacco monopoly, Tabacalera, when it merged with its French peer in 1999.  The 
Socialist Party reappointed him in 2004, indicating Telefónica’s growing autonomy 
from politics. During this period, Telefónica consolidated its international presence, 
staying in Latin America whilst also growing in Europe and has established joint 
ventures in China. It became the most global of all former telecommunications 
monopolies, and is ranked in fourth position world-wide in the sector by market 
capitalization, number one among European integrated operators, and number two in the 
Eurostoxx in 2010. It is the leader provider in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru and has 
substantial operations across most other Latin American countries, especially after 
acquiring BellSouth’s assets in the region in 2004. In addition, Telefónica expanded in 
Europe, acquiring the incumbent Cesky Telecom in 2005 and acquiring a license for 
mobile telephony in Slovakia in 2006. It also bought O2, BT’s subsidiaries operating in 
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany) in 2006, whilst an alliance was signed with 
Telecom Italia (10.49 percent of voting rights) in 2007.  
 
BT
5 
 
Origins as a State-controlled, government-run monopoly. From its origins in the late 
1870s, telecommunications provision across Britain was mixed, being provided by 
private sector companies, such as the National Telephone Company, and the public 
sector, particularly, the General Post Office (GPO), which formed part of the Civil 
Service bureaucracy. In 1896, the GPO took over the trunk service and, by 1912, it had 
taken over the entire system, excepting a few local authorities, thus unifying the 
network for the first time and effectively installing a public telecommunications 
monopoly. Telecommunications in Britain henceforth evolved under State ownership 
and control, unravelling only from the end of the 1960s. The pace and level of 
development of telecommunications in Britain from the 1880s to 1950 followed the 
European average (Millward, 2009: 102). During this period, numerous debates ensued 
as to whether the Post Office should be converted into a nationalised industry rather 
than its organization under the auspices of a government department. During the 1930s, 
the GPO was criticised as being too bureaucratic and ‘Edwardian’ in its running of the 
network and, though the Bridgeman Committee was set up in 1932 to investigate 
options for change, nothing materialised (HMSO, undated). Criticism sharpened during 
the 1950s as waiting lists for telephones rose to unacceptable levels but, again, no 
organizational changes were agreed. Lipartito (2004: 155) has argued that the 
fundamental problem plaguing the British network was long-term under-investment: the 
GPO was used by the government of the day as a tool of demand management, setting 
budget priorities according to macroeconomic needs until 1961. Furthermore, the failure 
to prioritise the national network was due to ‘powerful cultural context’ (Lipartito, 
2004: 161). Run by civil servants, it was assumed telecommunications were something 
a person either wanted, or did not; feeble efforts were made to commercialise or expand 
them, in comparison with other leader nations. Britain had instead historically 
                                                 
5 The incumbent supplier of telecommunications in Britain was called British Telecom 
from 1980 and BT from 1991.  
prioritised other forms of communication, particular, international cable and telegraph 
services, for both geopolitical reasons (controlling its empires) and for related business 
reasons (to serve its foreign investments and Multinational Corporations). Regarding its 
running of the national network, the GPO behaved as a ‘discriminating monopoly’, 
under-investing in low-profit services and taking profits where they were made. London 
was the main priority: with the densest population and the most important businesses, 
scarce resources were concentrated on the network, supporting the city’s development 
as a commercial, financial and residence capital (Lipartito, 2004: 157).  
 
The Road to Privatization. The Labour Party which came into power in 1964 pushed for 
reform, and finally opted to split Telecommunications from Post via the Post Office 
Act, 1969. At the same time, the Post Office ceased to be a government department, 
being established as a public corporation, a limited liability company whose shares were 
listed on the stock market. However, the Treasury still controlled the budget while the 
old functional management structure remained (Lipartito, 2004: 163). By the 1970s, the 
potential for technological change, such as digitalization and convergence of voice, data 
and image, were starting to be recognised, whilst official calculations of the required 
investment to modernise the British network were of increasing concern to politicians, 
making external finance look increasingly essential (Parker, 2009: 241). The Carter 
Committee Report in 1977 recommended Telecommunications and Post be split further, 
into two individual corporations, leading to the establishment of British Telecom in 
1980.  
 
The real watershed in the evolution of telecommunications occurred in the 1980s. 
Initially, privatization did not figure significantly in Conservative Party leader Margaret 
Thatcher’s manifesto, the surprising success of selling council houses from 1979 
prompted the government to embark properly on privatization (Clifton, Comín & Díaz-
Fuentes, 2003). The Conservative Party calculated that external finance would be 
necessary to modernise telecommunications in Britain, and various financial schemes 
were considered until outright divesture was finally chosen (Parker, 2009). Due to the 
Conservative Party’s desire to reduce the monopoly power of British Telecom (Parker, 
2009: 244), initial efforts were made to it up prior to the sale, citing the break-up of 
AT&T in the United States as a model. The unions, some managers, domestic 
equipment suppliers, the Labour Party and significant public opinion were against 
privatization per se, whilst unions and managers alike strongly opposed splitting up the 
enterprise (Parker, 2009: 295). Privatization would be more palatable all round if British 
Telecom was sold as a single entity. For political reasons, privatization was delayed 
until after the 1983 election. Meanwhile, the government settled with the second best 
option: forging limited competition (Florio, 2003). With the British 
Telecommunications Act of 1981, the liberalization of apparatus and maintenance was 
introduced. Simultaneously, the government helped engineer the establishment of a 
rival to British Telecom, Mercury Communications, owned initially by a consortium of 
Cable & Wireless, BT and Barclays Bank. Soon afterwards, both BP and Barclays 
withdrew leaving Cable & Wireless the sole owner. To protect and encourage Mercury, 
it was licensed as British Telecom’s only competitor as part of the ‘duopoly’ policy. 
Members of the government actively encouraged Mercury to engage in the broadest 
competition possible, but the firm refused to build a national network, preferring to use 
existing lines to cream-skim profitable business (Parker, 2009: 246).  
 
In 1984, the initial public offering of 51 percent of British Telecom shares was sold. 
This was the first time Britain had sold a national monopoly, and the sale was one of the 
largest public offerings to date, requiring the establishment of a new regulatory 
approach (known as the RPI-X formula) and an independent regulatory agency, the 
Office for Telecommunications. The way in which British Telecom was privatised came 
to represent a blueprint for the sale of other utilities, in Britain, Europe, Latin America 
and beyond (Clifton, 2000). The reasons behind the Conservative Party’s decision to 
privatise British Telecom in 1984 can be summarised into three main points. Firstly, 
from the practical side, it was recognised that new technology would require levels of 
investment that the government, constrained by its public debt, would not provide. As a 
private firm with growth potential, attracting this finance would not be an issue. 
Secondly, the government’s ideological stance was in favour of reducing the monopoly 
power of British Telecom and its unions, especially the Post Office Engineering Union, 
via the introduction of competition (Parker, 2009: 241-4). Thirdly, from a political 
economy perspective, the government was lobbied by the City and the Bank of England 
who claimed London’s hub as an international financial centre would be at risk without 
modern and efficiently working communications services.  
 
The sale was subject to much publicity including television, press, poster, radio, leaflet, 
and travelling road show campaigns. The offer was 3.2 times over-subscribed and 
concluded with 2.15 million investors (Parker, 2009: 312). Nigel Lawson, then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, lauded the sale as ‘the birth of people’s capitalism’ 
(Lawson, 1992, cited in Parker, 2009: 320). British Telecom was finally working under 
private company law, freed from former borrowing restrictions. The 1991 White Paper 
ended the duopoly, opening the door to increased competition from domestic and 
foreign providers. Renamed BT, the old red telephone boxes were replaced with class 
ones painted with a pied piper, whilst the firm was reorganised into profit centres, and 
staff retrained along commercial lines. Corporate governance was reformed, rendering 
its directors much more accountable towards shareholders than was the case in its 
Italian, French and German peers (Goldstein, 2000: 203), including through generous 
bonuses. BT helped facilitate the decline of the power of its unions (Hulsink, 1999: 
155), which in turn facilitated the introduction of more flexible labour contracts, merit-
based promotion and less generous pension schemes. Total privatization was completed 
in stages: in 1991, the government sold off half of its 47.6 percent of shares, and two 
years later, virtually all of its remaining shares. Finally, the incoming Labour 
government sold off its ‘golden share’ in 1997 which had been retained initially to 
avoid take-overs (HMSO, undated). 
 
BT abroad. BT’s new business environment, particularly technological and regulatory 
change, plus its new financial freedom, opened the door to its internationalization. Two 
main routes to internationalization were through Foreign Direct Investment and global 
alliances. BT opted largely for global alliances, particularly with large players based in 
the United States. Though its internationalization project started ambitiously, with 
hindsight it has been widely regarded as a failure (Turner & Gardiner, 2007). In 1994, 
BT (71.5 percent) and the United States’ second largest long-distance 
telecommunications firm, MCI (24.9 percent), entered a joint venture to provide global 
communication services to Multinational Corporations by establishing Concert. By 
1996, after a number of other operators, including Telefónica, joined, Concert was 
positioned to emerge as the leading provider of its kind, however, just before finalizing 
the merger between BT and MCI, MCI was bought by WorldCom. Telefónica 
abandoned the alliance to join WorldCom-MCI. Again, in 1998, BT and AT&T agreed 
to form a joint venture to serve Multinational Corporations, but the new Concert project 
was abandoned in 2001, and the companies were forced to embark on a costly de-
merger. BT was also forced to de-merge from its mobile activities in the form of 
MMO2, to reduce its debt caused by acquisitions and 3G licenses (van Kranenburg & 
Hagedoorn, 2008: 122).  
 
Conclusions 
 
This article sought to explain why, after regulatory change across the 
telecommunications sector from the 1970s, some of Europe’s former national 
telecommunications monopolies embarked on vigorous and successful international 
ventures, joining the ranks of the world’s leading Multinational Corporations, whilst 
others were much less successful, internationalizing either hesitantly, or else going 
abroad, failing and later de-internationalizing. For some scholars of international 
business, this uneven road to internationalization could be explained by short-term 
regulatory asymmetries between countries (Sarkar et al., 1999, Bonardi, 2004). That is, 
former monopolies based in countries where liberalization and privatization were 
delayed or restricted, relative to elsewhere, would internationalize more strongly, 
enjoying, as they did, greater access to monopoly rents, political diplomacy and inside 
information to facilitate their adventures abroad. Elsewhere, the authors showed this 
explanation to be unsatisfactory, since no significant correlation was found between 
firm internationalization, and speed and depth of liberalization and privatization 
(Clifton, Díaz-Fuentes & Revuelta, 2010). Data on firm internationalization, 
liberalization and privatization presented in this article confirmed that firms 
internationalized strongly both from country bases where policy had reached different 
stages. So, explanations for different internationalization must be found at the firm 
level. Taking as the point of departure the notion that firms do not operate in a vacuum, 
but are embedded in national contexts, including different regulatory frameworks, the 
article continued by exploring how regulation might have influenced firms’ later 
position and approach to the opportunity to internationalize. Following maximum 
variation case study methodology (Flyvbjerg, 2006), two large telecommunications 
firms were selected for analysis: Telefónica and BT. Both were based in large countries 
where privatization and liberalization had either been implemented earlier or on time, 
with respect to the European average but, these firms embodied two highly differing – 
near opposite - internationalization strategies. Telefónica ventured abroad very early on, 
in a vigorous and unrelenting fashion, mainly through FDI, emerging as one of the 
worlds’ most international of telecommunications former monopolies (UNCTAD, 
2010). BT started to internationalise somewhat later, though it was more active 
compared with many of its European peers. However, global alliances were prioritised 
over FDI and, each of these alliances failed successively. Later on, BT managers 
decided to partly de-internationalize and refocus on its home market. BT became the 
least international of the large European players. 
 
Explanations for radically different paths to internationalization can be found in an 
analysis of the historical evolution of the different regulatory frameworks in which each 
incumbent developed, particularly, through ownership, management style, access to 
capital and exposure to liberalization. As regards ownership, Telefónica was exceptional 
in the European context in that it was born not only as a private company, but as one 
controlled by an emerging US Multinational Corporation, ITT. Though private, foreign 
influence was greatly reduced when the firm was nationalized in 1944 under the Franco 
regime, nationalization was never total since the firm always remained partly controlled 
by private national banks and multiple shareholders. As regards management, 
Telefónica was never run by a PTT; management style was closer to that of a private 
firm than public administration. Moreover, even from its origins in 1924, Telefónica 
accumulated experience in generating finance externally, issuing multiple public 
offerings, even though these were subject to limits due to partial State ownership. From 
the 1980s, much of this finance would be obtained in international market and 
channelled towards its corporate internationalization, so these operations did not strain 
government budgets. The challenge of technological change in the telecommunications 
sector was met in Spain by a Socialist government in an optimistic period of democratic 
transition and membership of the European Community. As part of a general project of 
industrial restructuring, Telefónica was forced to change its management style. It broke    
its technological dependence on Standard Eléctrica (ITT) while forging technological 
and business alliances with suppliers world-wide, and improving domestic R&D. It was 
partially privatised, embarking on an internationalization strategy using finance from 
public offerings. Despite the fact that Spain was given a formal extension by the 
European Commission to introduce telecommunications liberalization CUT CUT it 
chose to assume the earlier deadline of 1998, in line with most other European 
countries. Nevertheless, Telefónica, unlike British Telecom, did enjoy some pampering 
as a ‘national champion’. Importantly, Telefónica’s foreign acquisitions in Latin 
America in the aftermath of the debt crisis were conducted from the cosy base of 
monopoly status. Despite formal liberalization, Telefónica continued to enjoy a high 
market share vis-à-vis many of its European peers.  
 
The ownership and management style of telecommunications in Britain contrasted 
sharply with the experience of Telefónica. In Britain, telecommunications were 
consolidated as a national network under State ownership and public administrative 
control from the end of the nineteenth century. Despite regular criticism that its 
managerial style was overly bureaucratic from the 1930 to the early 1960s, no major 
changes were introduced. As an arm of government, investment in British 
telecommunications was strictly limited, whilst its managers lacked commercial vision 
(Lipartito, 2004). Technological changes in the communications sector was a common 
watershed for governments around the world. In Britain, the government and the City 
concluded that the required investment could be generated were British Telecom to be 
privatised. This was used to justify its privatization, from 1984, though the government 
also had ideological reasons to promote its sale, particularly, to weaken the trade unions 
and the monopoly power of the firm (Parker, 2009), a policy later emulated by Latin 
American governments (Clifton, 2000). Though some in the government wished to split 
up British Telecom prior to the sale, when this failed, an alternative route was taken: the 
government would support the emergence of a rival, Mercury. The British government 
started to liberalise telecommunications markets well ahead of the European directive. 
Despite the fact that competition pressures on BT were limited (Florio, 2003), they were 
still greater than those faced by most of its European peers. In so doing, the government 
revealed they were not prepared to protect British Telecom as a ‘national champion’. 
When mobile phone licences were auctioned in the 1980s, Racal Electronics and Cable 
& Wireless, renamed Vodafone, emerged. Its international operations would soon 
overshadow the incumbent. With an increasingly contested home market and, without 
‘national champion’ backing, BT opted to internationalise through global alliances, 
particularly with key US firms like MCI. This strategy was generally perceived as a 
quicker and less risky path towards internationalization than that of FDI (Ulset, 2008). 
When its alliances failed successively, it is hardly surprising that management decided 
to refocus efforts on protecting its market share at home, effectively, partially de-
nationalizing. 
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